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The G7 ‘New Alliance for Food Security and Nutrition for Africa’ follows an established 
approach of ‘connecting smallholder farmers to markets’, while extending the role and 
influence of corporate agri-business in new ways. This paper explores implications of the 
‘New Alliance’ model’s incorporation into the Sustainable Development Goals framework for 
smallholder producers already facing greater uncertainly in financialised agri-food chains, 
and in light of a consensus around the primacy of private finance in the post 2015 era. The 
question for alternative food and development movements is how to confront the ‘value 
chain challenge’ 1 in an increasingly financialised global agri-food system.  
 
 
Key words: financialisation, agriculture and food security, sustainable development goals, 




Correct citation: Brooks (2016) ‘Inducing Food Insecurity: Financialisation and Development 
in the Post-2015 Era’ Third World Quarterly Vol. 37 No. 5 
http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/01436597.2015.1110014 
This is an Accepted Manuscript of an article published by Taylor & Francis in Third World 









By the end of 2015, the Millennium Development Goals (MDG) framework2 - the 
overarching framework for international development efforts for the last fifteen years - will 
have been succeeded by a new Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs)3 framework. At the 
same time, discussions on funding – or rather financing - the SDGs culminated in the Third 
(and final) International Conference on Financing for Development’ in Addis Ababa in July.4 
A key message from this conference was that ‘Financing for Development’ (FFD) in the post-
2015 era needs to go ‘beyond aid’, to include domestic resource mobilisation, ‘smart’ aid 
and, above all, the mobilisation of private finance. Private finance is now seen as essential 
to the achieving SDG agenda, with state and other public institutions set to play a ‘catalytic’ 
role in attracting the resources of the private sector. 
 
These proposals suggest a shift in donor policy. Development financing in the MDG era was 
largely ODA-driven, though private philanthropy played an increasingly significant role. And 
despite optimism in some quarters, the contribution of public private partnerships (PPPs) 
has been limited to date5. A key component of MDG funding was the Heavily Indebted Poor 
Countries (HIPC) debt relief programme, an initiative that is not highlighted for continuation 
or expansion post-20156. While this has disappointed some, this concern has been 
overshadowed by a ‘new lending boom to developing countries’7. In particular, many 
developing countries, particularly in Sub Saharan Africa have been borrowing from 
international capital markets: issuing sovereign bonds in international currencies over which 
they have no control. As of March 2015, Ghana, the first sub Saharan African nation after 
South Africa to borrow from international capital markets, has a debt-to-GDP ratio of 60.8 
percent.8 
 
Proposals for an expanded role for private finance in development are framed in terms of a 
shift from ‘isolated pilot activities’ to a ‘broad transformative agenda’9. These ‘isolated 
activities’ include both conventional public private partnerships and new approaches to 
investment in financial sectors in developing and transitional economies currently pursued 
by the World Bank’s private sector arm, the International Financial Corporation (IFC). The 




has drawn attention to proactive support, by the IFC, of ‘financial deepening’ as a 
development strategy ‘despite the failures of the financial systems of US and European 
countries in the last five years’10; concerned that civil society groups have yet to grasp how 
dynamics of financialisation in the global economy, and now the international development 
system itself are transforming the global development landscape. 
 
This paper takes as its entry point a major initiative which looks set to carry over from the 
MDG period into the post-2015 development era, that is the G7 New Alliance for Food 
security and Nutrition in Africa  (‘New Alliance’), launched by USAID and subsequently 
endorsed by the G8 (now G7) Summit. The New Alliance aims to accelerate agri-business 
investment in African agriculture as the route to lifting 50 million people out of poverty by 
202211. In a recent blog on the development financing debate, Alexander Their of USAID 
argues that the ‘ambitious goals’ of initiatives like the New Alliance ‘require a new model of 
development’ which combines ‘our spirit of innovation, an available pool of global capital, a 
demand for results and accountability and the pent up energy of millions of people 
worldwide to realise their own potential’12. 
 
The design of the New Alliance reflects more than a decade of agricultural development 
policy and practice aimed at ‘connecting smallholder farmers to markets’. However, while it 
retains the value chain as its main organizing principle, it goes further, and seeks to extend 
and deepen the involvement of the corporate agri-business sector in agri-food chains in 
developing markets. While these policies are promoted in the name of the smallholder 
farmer, however, civil society groups and researchers in agrarian studies have sounded the 
alarm that the main beneficiaries of such initiatives are likely to be the agri-business 
corporations themselves, as the actors best place to position themselves strategically in 
value chains to achieve their business goals, which undermining ecological and socio-
institutional foundation of smallholder farming and livelihood systems. In this case, they 
such policies may be described as ‘food insecurity inducing policies’13. 
 
These dynamics are intensified by the steady advance of financialisation within global agri-
food systems, which creates new sources of instability and uncertainty, particularly for small 




financialisation in an already complex agri-food system is often obscured, so that the role 
and impact of financial actors is not visible or clearly understood14. This ambiguity is 
amplified by the promotion, by multilateral development banks, of financial deepening, that 
is the liberalisation of financial markets in emerging markets, and financial inclusion, though 
the promotion of derivative products to smallholder farmers, as development strategies. 
Recent debates about the future of ‘food sovereignty’, which arose as a ‘counter movement 
to the neoliberal food regime’ institutionalized in WTO rules, ‘on hold’ since the Doha round 
stalled in 2008, are therefore timely15. There is a need, therefore, to better understand the 
challenges presented by an increasingly financialised agri-food system, and begin to map 
the contours of an emerging global food politics accordingly.  
 
Situating the ‘New Alliance’ 
 
The ‘G7 New Alliance for Food Security and Nutrition in Africa’ (‘New Alliance’) is a 
cooperation framework that was launched at the G8 summit in 2012. It includes ten African 
countries (so far), more than 100 private companies and range of donors. Its aim is to 
‘accelerate responsible investment in African agriculture and lift 50 million people out of 
poverty by 2022’. Its core requirement of African member states is that they ‘refine policies’ 
and ‘improve investment opportunities’ in order to facilitate private sector-led growth in 
agri-food sectors as the key to achieving food security16. 
 
The New Alliance can be viewed as having ‘stepped into the breach opened up by the food 
crisis’, although it was four years in the making17. The food price crisis of 2007-8 had thrown 
doubt on food security strategies that had become established in the course of the 
preceding decades, as the number of malnourished people exceeded 1 billion18. In 2009, at 
the G8 summit in L’Aquina, Italy, ‘the world’s richest countries pledged USD 22 billion over 3 
years to address hunger. Four years later, half the pledges had materialized’. In the 
intervening period, the G8 had developed new policies through which hunger might be 
managed’19. 
 
The series of events that culminated in the launch of the New Alliance can be traced back to 




followed by, among other things, the launch in 2006 of an ‘Alliance for a Green Revolution in 
Africa’ (AGRA) by the Gates and Rockefeller Foundations20. The design of AGRA centred on 
the ‘value chain’ as its organizing principle, as did the 2008 World Development Report 
‘Agriculture for development’ published the following year21. ‘Agriculture for Development’ 
envisaged a future for African agriculture ‘led by private entrepreneurs in extensive value 
chains linking producers to consumers and including many entrepreneurial smallholders’22. 
In this context, far from presenting ‘fresh’ thinking on agricultural markets, this framing 
served to ‘reunite Bank development discourse with recent transformations in the food 
regime’ favouring the ‘monopoly structure of agri-business’23. 
 
On the one hand, the New Alliance can be viewed as a continuation of the productivist-
modernist model at the heart of the ‘Long Green Revolution’24, and the ‘market fix’ that has 
dominated proposals and programmes for ‘getting African agriculture moving, for the last 
decade25 in particular the promise to release the productive potential of smallholder 
farmers as a ‘class in waiting’26. On the other hand, there are distinctive features that have 
allowed corporate actors to ‘normalise themselves as key aid actors’27. First and foremost, it 
is presented as an alliance built on principles of country ownership. It was launched by 
GROW Africa, ‘an African owned, country-led, multi-stakeholder platform’ co-sponsored by 
the World Economic Forum (WEF) and NEPAD, via its Comprehensive Africa Agricultural 
Development Programme28. 
 
The New Alliance vision takes as its starting point ‘the impossibility of ending hunger 
without the assistance of private capital’29. Furthermore, it sets out a clear vision as to what 
‘the market’ means, in terminology that goes beyond familiar terms such as value chains 
and public private partnerships (PPPs) to include ‘agricultural growth corridors’ as a 
mechanism for accessing ‘underutilised’ land for development, currently ‘top of the list’ for 
private investors; and ‘patient capital’, or ‘catalytic’ funding provided by public institutions 
such as donors and multilateral development banks that can reduce transaction costs that 
might otherwise present a barrier to private investment30. This, together with its alignment 
with CAADP priorities and ‘country-led’ programming has enabled the configuration of a 
‘hegemonic bloc’ at the national level that is able to ‘suppress… the possibility of alterative 





A large-scale investment model is also embedded in the SDG framework itself, most notably 
for agricultural development, which is modelled on the New Alliance32. According to 
Sexmith and McMichael33, ‘the difference between now and 2000 [when the predecessor 
MDG framework was launched] is the return of the land question’. This is not to say that 
land was not an issue in 2000. However, rather than tackle the restructuring conditions 
associated with the processes of agricultural trade liberalization that caused widespread 
eviction of smallholder producers, ‘the MDGs focused on their outcomes such as rural 
poverty and food insecurity, missing the point that corporate dominated markets reproduce 
such outcomes’34. As the MDG era comes to a close, rather than reflect on this blind spot, 
the architects of the SDGs are preparing to turn the page and accept the ‘inevitability’ of this 
increasingly hegemonic development model. 
 
This is clearly illustrated in a study of development paradigm changes in Tanzania in the final 
stages of the MDG era. Green35  shows that a transformation from the MDG social 
development model to a profit-driven economic growth agenda is already well underway. 
Green highlights the central role played by the Bill and Melinda Gates Foundation (BMGF), 
via its involvement in AGRA, in building hegemonic partnerships36 across the region in 
favour of a ‘Southern Africa Agricultural Growth Corridor’ (SAGCOT), which was ‘announced 
at a [WEF] meeting held in Tanzania in 2010’. As Green points out ‘the symbolism of Davos 
in Africa is deliberately indicative of the new development order of public-private 
partnerships, philanthrocapitalism, and technology enabled by corporate investment’37. 
 
These developments suggest that the SDG framework is likely to be a far cry from the vision 
articulated in “The future we want” – the collective output from the ‘Rio+20’ conference in 
201238 - and instead appear to be ‘channeling some very familiar ideas about the 
relationship between land, labour and capital’39 that have been a consistent thread linking 
the the 2008 World Development Report, AGRA, GROW Africa, G8 New Alliance and 
Tanzania’s SAGCOT, among others. Here the distinction drawn by Hickey and Mohan’s40 
between ‘imminent’ and ‘immanent’ development – that is, between ‘willed’ development 
policy and ‘underlying processes of development’ – is helpful, insofar as it highlights an 




of formalizing and legitimizing   ‘underlying processes of development’, shaped, in the case 
of food security and nutrition, by the priorities of an increasingly concentrated agri-business 
sector. 
 
Neoliberalism, financialisation and development 
 
The term neoliberalism is used in a variety of ways, in discourses of development and 
politics debates more broadly41. As a theory neoliberalism starts from a view that individual 
liberty and freedom are paramount, best achieved and protected by an institutional 
structure comprising strong private property rights, free markets, and free trade.  The 
implication is that the state should not be directly involved in the economy, but should use 
its power to protect property rights and institutions of the market42. The first experiment in 
implementing neoliberalism was Chile in the 1970s, followed by Britain and the US in the 
1980s, and thereafter throughout the OECD, in a retreat from Keynesian economic policies 
and the post-war 'welfare state' model.  
 
Neoliberal policies were transferred to many developing countries in the form of Structural 
Adjustment Programmes (SAPs), following a ‘prescription for development’ known as the 
‘Washington Consensus’43 in the 1980s and 1990s. During 1980-89 alone, 171 SAPs were 
introduced in countries in Sub Saharan Africa, with a further 57 being initiated by the end of 
199644. Key elements of SAPs were export promotion measures, civil service downsizing, 
trade liberalization and privatisation of state-owned enterprises. In the agriculture sector, 
adjustment meant dismantling social protections which had been put in place in the 
postcolonial era; including grain marketing boards, price supports and subsidy programmes. 
The impact of SAPs converged with changes brought about by the 1995 WTO Agreement on 
Agriculture. ‘A conservative estimate by the FAO for 16 countries in the global South’ found 
that ‘between 20 and 30 million’ small producers lost their land as a consequence of 
agricultural trade liberalization45. These transformations produced a global agrarian crisis 
that went largely unaddressed, as mentioned earlier, by an increasing technocratic 





The financial crisis of 2008 brought the issue of ‘financialisation’, and its relationship with 
neoliberalism and globalisation, into sharper focus. Financialisation is defined by Epstein47 
as the ‘increasing importance of financial markets, financial motives, and financial elites in 
the operation of the economy and its governing institutions, both at national and 
international levels’; and is widely understood to be ‘a response to the exhaustion of the 
Fordist economic growth model, where financial capital has replaced productive capital in 
the quest for new profits’48. Its relationship with neoliberalism, specifically its adherence to 
neoclassical economics is paradoxical, since the dynamics of financialisation expose the 
‘incoherence’ of this theory49, as demonstrated, for example, by the sheer scale of state 
intervention in the US and UK economies, in the form of quantitative easing, required to 
stablise the financial system in the aftermath of the crisis50. 
 
Similarly, the food price crisis of 2007-8 revealed the impact of speculative activity on 
commodity price volatility that threw doubt on neoliberal food security policy prescriptions. 
This is not to say that supply factors, notably ‘the diversion of acreage and food crop output 
for biofuel production’, and well as rising costs of agricultural inputs, did not also played a 
part51 as did the cumulative effects of decades of neglect of public agricultural extension 
following the implementation of structural adjustment policies. Nevertheless, ‘it is now 
quite widely recognized that financial speculation was the major factor behind the sharp 
price rise of many primary commodities, including agricultural items’52. Central to the 
debate was the role of speculative activity as having a market stablising effect – as predicted 
by neoclassical economic theory – or a destablising one. As Ghosh53 concludes, ‘the lesson 
here is unpleasantly straightforward: no country, however small and open, can afford to 
neglect domestic food production.’ In other words, far from being a route to food security, 
agricultural liberalization had made developing countries more food insecure; leading to the 
conclusion that future trade negotiations should ‘take this into account and reverse such 
requirements accordingly.’  
 
Fine54 argues that financialisation can be used as a lens to identify two distinct phases of 
neoliberalism. The first phase was characterized by ‘shock therapy’ that ran from the late 
1970s to the early 1990s, operationalized in the developing world under the ‘Washington 




fullest extent’, and led to widespread privatisation and deregulation of all aspects of 
economic activity and public service delivery. As Fine55 points out, ‘any form of privatisation 
has the potential to induce financialisation since it creates a stream of revenue that can be 
consolidated into assets that can become part of a derivative that is speculatively traded’. 
This phase has been succeeded by a ‘more overtly and extensively interventionist’ phase 
concerned with responding to effects of inequalities generated during the first phase, while 
at the same time sustaining the process of further financialisation. Or, to put it another way, 
‘shock therapy got as much privatization and private financial participation as possible, and 
now the state must pick up the debris and push the process much more fully through its 
own support’ as illustrated by the rescue of banks ‘too big to fail’ in the in the aftermath of 
the financial crisis56. 
 
The proposals put forward by the World Bank for development financing in the post-2015 
era57 are indicative of the public support deemed necessary for private investment in this 
second phase of neoliberalism, or the ‘post-Washington Consensus’ phase. The role of 
public institutions, both at state level, and of international donors and the Bank’s own 
agencies have clearly been assigned an interventionist role to facilitate further 
financialisation, through the provision of risk guarantees and ‘patient capital’58. As the 
report argues, the investment climate following the financial crisis does not favour 
developing states accessing capital markets when ‘investors search for safer and more liquid 
assets’. In this climate multilateral development banks can play an ‘honest broker role’ by 
‘mainstreaming the use of guarantees and risk insurance’. Also highlighted is the strategy of 
financial sector development in developing countries, as a means of fostering ‘financial 
deepening and inclusion to accelerate private sector-led growth’59. The Bank’s private sector 
arm, the International Financial Corporation (IFC) is already active in this sector, channeling 
substantial funds to private banks and financial intermediaries in emerging markets60. 
 
Another strategy is the identification of financial products as development tools which can 
be promoted to particular groups under the banner of ‘financial inclusion’. One product that 
is being actively promoted at present is index-based agricultural insurance (IBAI) for 
smallholder farmers. IBAI is, despite its ‘insurance’ label, a weather derivative though which 




products are also championed by the IFC, together with Oxfam, the UN, G20, Grameen 
Foundation, and agri-business corporations as a vehicle for simultaneously modernising and 
‘climate proofing’ smallholder agriculture62. Crucially, state support is required for the roll 
out of these products, contributing to product development, being the ‘reinsurer for 
catastrophic risks’ and investing in infrastructure such as networks of weather stations – 
framed as a ‘public good’ – ‘albeit one that can be appropriated for [private] financial gain.’ 
Taken together, such costs often exceed those previously allocated to purportedly 
‘inefficient’ public subsidies63.  
 
The examples of direct and indirect public sector support for private investors in emerging 
markets discussed here are indicative of the normalization of public sector support for 
further financialisation, less than five years after a global financial crisis. As such, they are 
consistent with Fine’s64 location of the ‘post-Washington consensus’ in the second phase of 
neoliberalism.  While ‘the first shock phase of neoliberalism had already pushed through the 
easiest and most profitable privatisations’, the challenge, in the second phase, was to tackle 
‘problematic’ outcomes of previous privatisations while furthering – and deepening – the 
process of financialisation. This has required a ‘repositioning’ of the state, from an 
(unfavourable) alternative to the private sector, to ‘a source of resources to enable the 
private sector to participate in the provision of economic and social infrastructure’65; which 
is precisely the role allocated to the state in its proposals for post-2015 development 
financing.  
        
New frontiers of financialisation: food, farming and farmland 
 
The food crisis of 2007-8 drew attention to the extent and impact of financialisation within 
the agri-food sector66. To understand the implications of greater agri-business involvement 
in developing country agriculture, particularly in the smallholder sectors, as envisaged in 
initiative like the New Alliance, it is necessary to trace the origins and extent of 
financialisation in the agri-food sector and consider how this might intersect with the 





Processes of financialisation in the global food system have been underway since the late 
1970s, following the introduction of ‘New Financial Architecture (NFA)’, that is, the 
regulatory framework governing national (US) and international financial flows. The NFA 
was ‘based on light regulation of commercial banks, even lighter regulation of investment 
banks, and little if any regulation of the “shadow banking system” – hedge and private 
equity funds and bank-centred Special Investment Vehicles’67 and reflected the accepted 
wisdom of the time, that less regulation would lead to the emergence of more ‘efficient’ 
markets. As a result, a range of financial institutions were allowed to enter new markets 
from which they have previously been excluded, notably those of agricultural derivatives, 
farmland and agro-food enterprises.  
 
Further regulatory constraints were removed by the Commodity Futures Modernisation Act 
(CFMA), passed by the US in 2000, as a result of intensive lobbying since the 1980s. In 
particular, ‘position limits’ for speculators were removed, and additional investors (e.g. 
hedge funds, pension funds, insurance companies, sovereign wealth funds and investment 
banks) were allowed enter the market for agricultural derivatives. The arrival of these new 
financial actors, particular those from the ‘shadow banking’ sector tipped the balance from 
a market shaped primarily by hedging to one driven by speculative betting. New types of 
product, such as the commodity index funds (CIF) pioneered by Goldman Sachs, which 
bundled derivatives for a variety of commodities into a single value, became the product of 
choice for new institutional investors who had little knowledge of commodity markets. 
Agricultural risk was thus transformed into an asset class68. 
 
While the growth of the agricultural futures market is an obvious example of financialisation 
of the agri-food sector, the integration of financial actors and activities can be found in all 
parts of the value chain. While most people are aware of the transformation of the global 
food system by the rise of large northern retailers, less visible has been the involvement of 
financial actors who, together with supermarket chains, have come to dominate agri-food 
value chains at the expense of agricultural producers and labourers, and suppliers69. In this 
case, financialisation of food retailing has ‘blurred the boundaries’ between financial and 
‘real’ sectors. While financial actors have gained a sizeable stake in food sales (the high 




example), food retailers earn more revenues from financial activities, either by redirecting 
cash flows into financial (rather than productive) investments or by diversifying their own 
activities into financial services such as credit cards, insurance products, etc70.  
 
Similar dynamics can be found in the food manufacturing and processing and grain trading 
sectors. For example, an analysis of strategies of the ‘ABCDs’ (the four largest grain traders - 
ADM, Bunge, Cargill, Louis Dreyfus) Isakson71 shows how these large conglomerates blur the 
boundary between finance and food. While these businesses have always engaged in 
‘hedging against undesirable price movements’ there has been a discernible shift towards 
speculative activity. ‘Due to their dominance of agricultural trade and their direct contact 
with food suppliers, the ABCDs are among the first to know about supply conditions, making 
their financial products particularly attractive to investors wishing to speculate on the 
agricultural derivatives market’72. Meanwhile, financial actors are becoming active in food 
trading, not only by investing in grain traders’ funds, but also the physical storage and 
transport of commodities. ‘In addition to purchasing livestock, grain and agricultural 
products, these funds have acquired storage facilities and transport vessels, enabling them 
to buy maturing contracts from fellow investors. In addition to charging fees for their 
services, the funds benefit from more direct access to information about agricultural 
supply’73. 
 
This blurring of financial and ‘real’ assets and activities is illuminated by Fairbairn74 in the 
case of investment in farmland. Previously an ‘investment backwater’, farmland has become 
increasingly attractive to investors looking for more secure and profitable places to put 
money following the commodity price spikes and collapse of the US housing market in 2008. 
This is leading to an escalation of ‘land grabs’ in the developing world75, as well as 
accelerating land speculation in developed land markets76. Interestingly, while the ‘turn to 
farmland’ may appear to indicate a shift away from financialisation, towards investment in 
‘real’ assets, Fairbairn argues that patterns of financialisation in the farmland sector, 
including the ‘first tentative steps toward the securitisation of farmland’ point to the 





Research into financialisation in the farmland sector is at a relatively early stage. This is also 
true, thought to a lesser degree, of studies of financialisation of food more broadly, which 
began to emerge following the global food price crisis of 2007-878. Nevertheless, clear 
themes are emerging. As in the cases of food retailing and processing and grain trading, 
various kinds of institutional and sectoral ‘crossover’ are taking place, which obscure the 
nature and extent of financialisation and its effects. In the case of farmland investment, a 
new institutional form, which Fairbairn79 calls the ‘Farmland Investment Management 
Organisation (FIMO)’ is emerging across the financial and agribusiness sectors,  allowing 
financiers to ‘use land as a productive asset, while operators are using land as a financial 
asset.’ Farmland is thus transformed into a ‘quasi-financial asset’ – ‘like gold with yield’ – 
whose financial qualities are valued in ways relate to its productive qualities. 
 
Despite growing concern about escalating land speculation in the South80, international 
financial institutions, notably the World Bank’s Multilateral Investment Guarantee Agency 
(MIGA) and IFC, have nevertheless been active facilitators of investments in ‘frontier’ 
markets such as farmland in Latin America and Africa. The MIGA, for example, ‘provide 
contracts that guarantee foreign direct investment against a number of risks’, while the IFC 
has 'launched a US$500 million fund that protects investors with an exit option from funds 
operating in emerging markets, thereby making their investments more liquid. Taken 
together, these initiatives have facilitated financial actors’ acquisition of low-priced 
farmland in the South, while reducing the risks of doing so’81. Meanwhile, the World Bank 
and, perhaps more surprisingly UNCTAD continue to promote derivatives to smallholder 
farmers despite compelling evidence that derivatives markets dominated by speculators do 
not smooth price volatility but exacerbate it82. 
 
The implications of these developments for global food politics are highlighted by Clapp83 as 
the consequence of ‘distancing’ in the agri-food system as a result of financialisation. This 
arises, firstly, from the diversity of new actors that populate the food system, together with 
the proliferation of complex financial instruments, which both abstract the commodity from 
its physical form, and reconnect with physical markets in new and complex ways. The 
second distancing effect arises from the first. The combined effect of these multiple 




the political context’84, enabling financial actors and investment tools that contributed to a 
global food crisis that led to widespread hunger and political instability in several regions of 
the developing world to be reformulated as essential elements of a development model 
designed with the needs of smallholder farmers in mind. This is despite compelling evidence 
that smallholder farmers are ‘arguably the biggest losers of the financialisation of the food 
system’85.  
 
Conclusion: an emerging global food politics? 
 
The design of the G7 New Alliance for Food Security and Nutrition for Africa (‘New Alliance’) 
reflects more than a decade of agricultural development policy and practice aimed at 
‘connecting smallholders to markets’ in extensive value chains that extend beyond national 
borders to include a wide range of public and private organisations. Despite an image of 
institutional plurality, however, it has become increasingly clear that the main beneficiaries 
of this development model are not the smallholder farmers around whose needs these 
programmes have purportedly been designed, but agri-business corporations best able to 
position themselves strategically within these value chains and use this leverage to influence 
international and national policies, notably in land acquisition and seed regulation, to their 
advantage86.  
 
What McMichael87 has called the ‘value chain challenge’ is being intensified by the ongoing 
reorientation of the global agri-food system according to the priorities and logics of 
‘financial actors, financial motives and financial elites’.  Processes of financialisation that are 
underway throughout the value chain are obscured by dynamics of ‘distancing’ that are a 
consequence of financialisation. The role of financial actors throughout the value chain, and 
in particular their role in generality instability in the global agri-food system, can thus 
remain hidden from view88. This ambiguity has been exacerbated, in the years that have 
followed devastating global food and financial crises, with the active promotion, by 
international donors, of financial deepening, that is the liberalisation of financial markets in 
emerging markets, and financial inclusion, though the promotion of derivative products to 
smallholder farmers, for example, alongside continued support for corporate agri-business 





Recent debates about the use and interpretation of food sovereignty ‘as an idea for an 
alternative food system and as a global social movement’89 are therefore timely. This 
concept emerged in the early 2000s in response to a ‘global food crisis triggered by northern 
dumping of foodstuffs, institutionalized in WTO trade rules’ and centred on the rights of 
developing states to determine domestic food policy. Since the Doha ‘development’ round 
of WTO talks stalled in 2008 a web of free trade agreements and bilateral investment 
treaties has grown to fill the vacuum. In the process, the ‘free trade’ mantra has given way 
to an ‘investment-led assault’, in which ‘circulation of food is compounded by global 
financial flows into enclosing land for industrial agriculture and/or speculation, challenging 
small producer rights all over the world’90. In this context, the hegemony of the ‘value chain’ 
is enabling a process of ‘control grabbing… under the guise of smallholder support’91. The 
challenge, therefore, for alternative food movements is in finding ways to confront the 
‘value chain challenge’ in an increasingly financialised global agri-food system, and the 
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